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Administrative Agency Action
After Remand
Bernard S. Goldfarb
Through a comparative analysis of cases decided in the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Goldfarb calls
attention to a serious problem in administrative procedure. it is his
view that, in many cases, appellate courts reverse the rulings of adminis-
trative agencies without providing adequate instructions regarding addi-
tional evidence, testimony, and findings of fact. This enables the agency
to reconsider the remanded case according to the dictates of its own dis-
cretion rather than those of the reviewing court, thereby rendering the
litigant's right to judicial review "a meaningless formdity." The author
concludes that appellate courts can resolve this problem by issuing specific
instructions for administrative agencies to follow on remand.
N THE 1962 CASE of Lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers,'
the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a Board of Tax Appeals'
entry as to whether trucks leased from Lakeside by two large re-
tail furniture stores were subject to the Ohio sales tax.2 Although
the record contained uncontra-
dicted testimony that the trucksTHE AUTHOR (A.B., LL.B., Western weeu dtohublk ies
Reserve University) is a practidng at- were used to haul bulky items
torney in Cleveland, Ohio, and a mem- to the stores' customers, the
ber of the American and the Ohio State Board concluded that "there isBar Associations. no evidence that appellant was
in the business of making 're-
tail sales' of furniture and appliances, and it is therefore obvious that
its claim that it used the trucks directly in making retail sales is
without merit."3 Rather, Lakeside was held to be in the business of
making "retail sales" of automotive equipment.'
1173 Ohio St. 108, 180 N.E.2d 140 (1962), reviewing Case No. 45016, Ohio
B.T.A., June 2, 1961, on remand, Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., April 13, 1962, affld,
174 Ohio St. 405, 189 N.E.2d 723, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963).
2 Omo REv. CODE § 5739.01 provides in part:
(B) "Sale" and "selling" include all transactions by which title or pos-
session, or both, of tangible personal property, is or is to be transferred ..
for a consideration ... whether for a price or rental....
(M) "Retail sale" and "sales at retail" include all sales except those in
which the purpose of the consumer is:
(2) ... to use or consume the thing transferred directly ... in
making retail sales ....
3 Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., pp. 3-4, June 2, 1961.
4 Ibid.
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In reversing the Board's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the rental of one of Lakeside's trucks would not constitute a
taxable event under the statute if the truck were used by the furni-
ture stores in making retail sales.5 Furthermore, the court found
that it was necessary to remand the case for further proceedings,6
since the Board had not considered whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the furniture companies utilized the
rented trucks in delivering items sold to customers under contracts
which were not completed until delivery was made.
Notwithstanding the decision of the supreme court; the Board
summarily and without notice caused an entry to be made which
stated that the testimony regarding use of the trucks was mere opin-
ion and that there was no evidence in the record to indicate that the
witness was in any position to know exactly how the trucks were
being used; therefore, there was no proof that the trucks were used
in such a way as to exempt the rental charges from sales taxation (a
conclusion which was not based on any evidence in the record).8
The Board concluded that "the testimony and evidence in the record
is insufficient to support the finding that the purpose of the furniture
company was to use the rented trucks for diliveries [sic] of items soldto retail customers under contracts of sale not to be completed until
such deliveries had been made."'
Again the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio,"0
but the court stated:
The Board of Tax Appeals could very well have opened up the
case and heard additional evidence on the question but apparently
did not think it necessary to do so....
From an examination of the record, this court is unable to find
that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is unreasonable or
unlawful"1 i
The problem thus presents itself: Shall an administrative agency,
after remand by a reviewing court, proceed on the record before it
or rehear the matter in whole or in part, and under what circum-
stances shall it take such action? The various opinions in the Lake-
r 173 Ohio St. at 109, 180 N.E.2d at 141.
6Id. at 110, 180 N.E.2d at 142.
7 Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., April 13, 1962.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 405, 189 N.E.2d 723, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963).
11 Id. at 407, 189 N.E.2d at 724.
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side Truck Rental case'2 very neatly present these questions. It
should be pointed out, however, that we are not concerned here
with the scope of review, the weight or value of uncontradicted testi-
mony before an administrative agency, the procedural niceties of
appeal, or the fact-finding duties of an administrative agency, but
only with that course of action taken by an administrative body after
remand.
The appeal to the supreme court in 1962 established the prin-
ciple of law that leased trucks used directly in making a delivery,
which is an essential part of making a retail sale, are exempt from
the sales tax. 3 This conclusion was based on the record before the
court. On the same record, however, the Board of Tax Appeals in
its second opinion engaged in a lengthy discussion of the type of
evidence the taxpayer "could have" and "should have" presented.'4
But the court, in its second (1963) decision, stated that the Board
was empowered but not obligated to receive additional evidence. 5
On remand, therefore, if the decision as to whether or not a case
should be reopened lies with the administrative agency, it becomes
a simple matter for that agency to ignore the law as laid down by a
reviewing court and replay the facts to justify its original position.
A reviewing court formulates new law based upon the record
before it;'6 however, an administrative agency can find that it does
not agree with the reviewing court because of matters not in that
record. Although the agency is the exclusive fact finder on remand
with legal pronouncements, it is faced with one of two courses:
(1) proceed on the record as it appeared on the appeal, or (2) reopen
the proceedings for additional hearings.'
It would appear that - in the absence of a mandate requiring
a rehearing - when a reviewing court enunciates a new principle
of law which was rejected by the agency or when the record is in-
sufficient for the legal concept to be applied, the administrative
agency should rehear the case on its own motion. If, after such a
rehearing, the agency can come to no other conclusion, then at least
12 Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., June 2, 1961, reviewed, 173 Ohio St. 108, 180
N.E.2d 140 (1962), on remand, Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., April 13, 1962, aft'd,
174 Ohio St. 405, 189 NYB.2d 723 (1963).
1 3 tLakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 108, 110, 180 N.E.2d 140,
141 (1962).
14 Case No. 45016, Ohio B.T.A., April 13, 1962.
15 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
16 Omo REV. CODE § 5717.04.
1 7 Doldn Corp. v. FTC, 219 F.2d 742, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 981 (1955).
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the remand was not futile. Reviewing courts and administrative
agencies each have their respective roles. When a reviewing court
lays bare an error of law, its function ends and "at that point the
matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration."18  A
reviewing court, after baring an error and compelling obedience to
its correction, exhausts its power. At this point the agency is again
charged with the duty of "judging"1 and, although it is not fore-
closed from enforcing legislative policy, its new order must not con-
flict with the reviewing court's mandate.2"
In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,2" the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the action of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in refusing to allow the management of a corporation to
place recently purchased preferred stock on an equal par with the
corporation's other preferred stock during a reorganization period.
There was no issue of fraud or lack of disclosure and there was no
dispute as to the facts. In justifying its action, the Commission
stated that it was merely applying "the broad equitable principles
enunciated in the cases heretofore cited."22  The Court, however,
could not find that the transaction violated any statutory prohibition,
judicial doctrine, or any rule of the Commission within its delegated
authority. The case was therefore remanded to the Commission.24
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black concurred with the
action of the Commission and agreed that such action was "appro-
priate."" He also concurred with the Commission's reliance upon
the common law and stated: "As judges we are entitled to a sense
of gratification that the common law has been able to make so sub-
stantial a contribution to the development of the administrative law
of this field.
' 26
The matter again came before the Supreme Court three years
later.27  The Court found that after its remand, the Commission
"reexamined the problem, recast its rationale and reached the same
18 FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952).
19FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940).
2 0FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 379 (1965).
21318 U.S. 80 (1943).
22 Id. at 87 (quoting from the SEC opinion).
23 Id. at 93.
2Id. at 95.
25 Id. at 97-98.
26 Id. at 98.
27 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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result."2 , Such reexamination, however, was held to have been suf-
ficient and the Commission's decision was affirmed on the ground
that it rested "squarely in that area where administrative judgments
are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts."29
While Chenery Corp. and Lakeside Truck Rental have very lit-
tle in common except the fact that, in both cases, a reviewing court
confirmed an administrative action which had previously been re-
jected, the dissenting opinion in the second Chenery decision" is
equally applicable to both cases. Mr. Justice Jackson first called
attention to the fact that the Commission had reached the same re-
sult on remand even though there had been "no change in the order,
no additional evidence in the record and no amendment of relevant
legislation ... ,"" The effect of the Court's affirmance, therefore,
was said to make "judicial review of administrative orders a hope-
less formality for the litigant . ..."" He concluded:
I suggest that administrative experience is of weight in judicial
review only to this point - it is a persuasive reason for deference
to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary powers under
and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support action outside
of the law. And what action is, and what is not, within the law
must be determined by courts, when authorized to review, no mat-
ter how much deference is due to the agency's fact finding.83
Although Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Chenery is generally
applicable to the Lakeside Truck Rental case, it should be noted that
there are some distinctions between the two cases. First, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission recognized the issue in Chenery,
whereas in Lakeside Truck Rental the Board of Tax Appeals failed
to recognize it. Second, no new principle of substantive law was
announced in Chenery, while in Lakeside the court established a
principle of primary significance on the first appeal that was not
applied in the first administrative hearing. Third, the Court in
Chenery was concerned with the agency's rationale rather than its
conclusion, whereas in Lakeside the court was concerned only with
the Board's conclusion. Finally, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission did not require any additional evidence to justify its conclu-
sion upon remand of the Chenery case. In Lakeside, however, the
28Id. at 196 (quoting from the SEC opinion).
291d. at 209.
S0d. at 209-18.
31 Id. at 210.
32Ibid.
33 Id. at 215.
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Board admitted that it would have liked to hear the testimony of an
officer of one of Lakeside's customers, speculated as to how the
trucks could have been used, and meditated on how Lakeside "should
have" proved its case regardless of the uncontradicted testimony
in the record.84
In the second Lakeside appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court was con-
cerned with not substituting its judgment in factual issues for that
of the Board of Tax Appeals in spite of the fact that in the same
opinion it stated that the Board could have reopened the case and
heard additional evidence but apparently thought it unnecessary to
do so." The question arises, however, as to when additional evi-
dence is needed and by whom this decision is to be made. "Surely
an administrative agency is not a law unto itself . ,, " If left to
the agency's initiative, is not the decision an "encouragement ... to
conscious lawlessness as a permissible principal rule of administra-
tive action"? If so, the continued effectiveness of judicial review
is endangered.
Only a reviewing court can effectuate its mandates. An admin-
istrative agency should certainly not be left to do as it may think
necessary. If the agency can do as it pleases, it can always recast
its rationale to justify its first decision and make "judicial review of
administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant.""8
In the first decision in Lakeside, the Ohio Supreme Court pointed
out that the question involved was not as the Board indicated in its
opinion and went on to enumerate the new principle of law about
which "there are no decisions of this court."89 In view of the fact
that the Board of Tax Appeals had ignored the question completely,
it could not very well have considered the question of whether the
evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, in its second opinion the
Board became very specific regarding the type of evidence it "should
have" and "would have" heard.4" Under these circumstances, the
Board should have heard additional testimony regardless of the fact
that the record contained uncontradicted testimony regarding the
34 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
35 Lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 405, 407, 189 NE.2d 723,
724 (1963).
6 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
87 1d. at 217 (dissenting opinion).
38 Id. at 210 (dissenting opinion).
8 9 Lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 108, 109, 180 N.B.2d 140,
141 (1962).
40 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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transactions. By relying upon its discretion, the Board may have
frustrated not only the court's decision but also the demands of
justice.
The problem is easily solved by reviewing courts being more
specific in their orders of remand - once it has been determined
that remand is necessary. If the court finds the record adequate to
establish a new principle of law, that record is at least adequate for
an administrative agency to follow the law of the case unless the re-
viewing court indicates otherwise.
Generally, a reviewing court may: (1) affirm (if the order is
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in
accordance with law); (2) reverse, vacate, or modify the order; (3)
make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence and is in accordance with law; or (4) remand
the case with instructions to enter an order consistent with the find-
ings and with its opinion. 1 The last is our concern. In the usual
case, the court first determines whether the correct rule of law was
applied to the facts found and
whether there was substantial evidence before the Board to sup-
port the findings made.... If the Board has failed to make an
essential finding and the record on review is insufficient to provide
the basis for a final determination, the proper procedure is to re-
mand the case for further proceedings before the Board... And
the same procedure is appropriate even when the findings omitted
by the Board might be supplied from examination of the record.42
Upon remand, it would seeem that it is the reviewing court's respon-
sibility to determine whether the record is sufficient. Since this
decision is an essential aspect of the review and the basis. for a legal
determination of the issues, it cannot be delegated to the adminis-
trative agency. The rule to be followed was stated in FTC v. Curtis
Publishing Co.:" "[Ihe Court must also have power to examine
the whole record and ascertain for itself the issues presented and
4 1 An appeal from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals to the Supreme Court of Ohio is
based on Ohio Revised Code § 5717.04 which reads in part:
If upon hearing and consideration of such record and evidence the court de-
cides that the decision of the board appealed from is reasonable and lawful it
shall affirm the same, but if the court decides that such decision of the board
is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate the decision
or modify it and enter final judgment in accordance with such modification.
42 Helvering v. Bankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131-32 (1935). (Footnotes omitted.)
In other words, on remand if findings are absent which may be made on the basis of
evidence already received, a rehearing is not necessary. However, if evidence material
to a particular point is required, it may be heard.
4a3 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
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whether there are material facts not reported by the Commission."44
The Court went on to say:
If there be substantial evidence relating to such facts from which
different conclusions reasonably may be drawn, the matter may be
and ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to the Commission
- the primary factfinding body - with direction to make addi-
tional findings, but if from all the circumstances it clearly appears
that in the interest of justice the controversy should be decided
without further delay the court has full power under the statute so
to do.
45
The phrase "with direction to make additional findings" is recog-
nized by the courts but not always contained in a remand. A re-
viewing court must give "instructions" to an administrative agency
to carry out rulings and make correct findings. 46 There is no limi-
tation as to the manner in which a remand is worded, and the ad-
ministrative agency should therefore confine itself to the issues and
the law as recited by the reviewing court. Concise and specific
instructions are required in order that no interpretation will be neces-
sary to determine the reasons for remand. For example, there was
no doubt as to the significance of remand in FTC v. Carter Prods.,
Inc.,' in which the Court stated:
Certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated. The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals with
directions to reinstate its prior judgment and order after amending
it so that it specifically authorizes the Federal Trade Commission
to open this proceeding for further evidence and a new order con-
sistent with the Court of Appeals opinion herein.48
The remand is a judicial precept that must be enforced as written
because it is the judgment of the reviewing court. If it is dear and
"plainly means a rehearing of the issues as if the former hearing
has not been had,"49 then an administrative agency will not act as
it may deem necessary but will act in a manner consistent with the
reviewing court's decree.
An administrative agency which has acted under a mistaken
view of law should have its order set aside, and the proceedings on
remand should include a hearing de novo. ° Although this proce-
441d. at 580. (Emphasis added.)
45 bid. (Emphasis added.)
46 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 133 Ohio St. 212, 213-14, 12 N.E.2d
765, 768 (1938).
47 346 U.S. 327 (1953).
48 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
49 In re Plainfield-Union Water Co., 14 N.J. 296, 303, 102 A.2d 1, 5 (1954).
50 See Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 650, 670,
54 S.E.2d 169, 180 (1949).
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dure was not followed in Lakeside Truck Rental,51 that case under-
scores the necessity for reviewing courts to recognize that the deci-
sion as to whether or not an administrative agency shall rehear is a
judicial function. The mandate must be more specific than the
language usually used - "Reversed and remanded for proceedings
in conformity with this opinion." More direction is needed: "The
order of the court below is vacated, and the record is remanded to
said court with direction to return it to the commission for further
hearing, consideration, and disposition in accordance with the appli-
cable law."5  This language leaves no doubt as to the purpose of
remand, and the administrative agency thus retains its fact-finding
functions (within the substantial evidence concept) without any en-
croachment by the courts. More important, such an order would
leave the determination of applicable law to the courts and would
insure the primacy of judicial determinations over administrative
orders.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has stated that Mr. Justice Jack-
son's dissent in the second Chenery opinion" "is surprising."54  He
raised the issue of whether the Chenery case was any different "from
any other case in which an agency applies a statutory standard
where it has not been applied before"55 and went on to say that the
dissent was mistakenly based on the proposition that the Commis-
sion declined to promulgate a rule.5" Professor Davis also exam-
ined Mr. Justice Jackson's discussion of the retroactive nature of the
Commission's decision and concluded that all adjudication, "judicial
and administrative, involves some degree of retroactive law mak-ing.,357
The rule-making powers of administrative agencies and the re-
troactive effects of commission action are not necessarily concerned
with clear and concise mandates from reviewing courts to adminis-
trative bodies. It would seem that these questions would dissipate
themselves if commission action had legislative sanction and, if not,
most certainly by judicial review, reversal, and remand with specific
instructions. The remand question does not seem to concern Pro-
51 Lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 405, 189 N.E.2d 723 (1963).
52 Pennsylvania State Athletic Comm'n v. Bratton, 177 Pa. Super. 598, 608, 112
A.2d 422, 426 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
53 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209-18 (1947).
542 DAvis, ADMNIS TIV E IAW TREATISE § 17.08, at 536 (1958).
55 Id. at 537.
56 Ibid.
57 Id. at 538.
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fessor Davis, who is of the opinion that a more persuasive dissenting
opinion in the Chenery case might have been written; he suggested
that agencies give an indication of their attitudes by rule-making or
by "warning through a dictum, a Commissioner's speech, a publi-
cized letter, or a press release."58 In raising the query whether an
opinion should have been written along these lines, however, he
concluded that "for the courts to hold illegal, unfair, unauthorized,
or unconstitutional what are substantially the same methods of law
development that are traditional in the judicial system may seem to
many to be incongruous and impracticable." 9
No one can deny that an administrative agency must neces-
sarily consider mixed questions of law and fact in its decisions. The
question of the proper procedure to be followed after remand can
be no different than that faced by a lower court if Professor Davis'
statement is applicable, and it is believed to be. If the comparison
to a lower court is valid (and this article is not concerned with that
feature), then the administrative agency should not claim to have an
exclusive expertise but should be bound by the law of the case as
established by a reviewing court. It is incumbent upon reviewing
courts to effectuate their mandates upon remand without allowing
administrative agencies to claim super-legal powers to "recast ra-
tionale"8" and take such action as they see fit. There is no review
of a reviewing court's language in the order of remand.
5 81d. at 540.
59 Id. at 541.
60 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 210 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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